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Abstract. An insurer has to know the risks faced by a potential client
to accurately determine an insurance premium offer. However, while the
potential client might have a good understanding of its own security
practices, it may also have an incentive not to disclose them honestly
since the resulting information asymmetry could work in its favor. This
information asymmetry engenders adverse selection, which can result in
unfair premiums and reduced adoption of cyber-insurance. To overcome
information asymmetry, insurers often require potential clients to self-
report their risks. Still, clients do not have any incentive to perform
thorough self-audits or to provide comprehensive reports. As a result,
insurers have to complement self-reporting with external security audits
to verify the clients’ reports. Since these audits can be very expensive, a
key problem faced by insurers is to devise an auditing strategy that deters
clients from dishonest reporting using a minimal number of audits. To
solve this problem, we model the interactions between a potential client
and an insurer as a two-player signaling game. One player represents the
client, who knows its actual security-investment level, but may report any
level to the insurer. The other player represents the insurer, who knows
only the random distribution from which the security level was drawn,
but may discover the actual level using an expensive audit. We study the
players’ equilibrium strategies and provide numerical illustrations.
1 Introduction
Technological innovations, such as artificial intelligence and ubiquitous comput-
ing, are becoming integral parts of our lives, and providing us with many benefits.
But these developments also bring new threats, and the insurance industry is
playing catch-up to keep pace with the rapid rise of cyber-risks. Cyber-threat
remains one of the most significant—and growing—risks facing businesses. For
example, a UK government survey estimated that in 2014, 81% of large corpo-
rations and 60% of small businesses have suffered a security breach. The average
cost of breaches, in the UK, was between £600,000 and £1.15 million for large
businesses and between £65,000 and £115,000 for small businesses [1]. Further,
in 2016, more than 1.1 billion identities were stolen in data breaches, almost dou-
ble the number stolen in 2015 [23]. In aggregate, Forbes reports that cyber-crime
losses will be more than US$2.1 trillion by 2019 [9].
Unfortunately, even with the strongest cyber-security controls purchased and
implemented, an organization is at risk of being compromised. As such, apart
from security measures, responses to cyber-security risk include outsourcing it by
purchasing cyber-insurance coverage. However, 60% of Fortune 500 companies
still lack any insurance against cyber-incidents, primarily due to a lack of cover
currently available for many types of cyber-risk [14].
Cyber-insurance, as any other field of insurance, faces a number of chal-
lenges [6,15,16]. In particular, asymmetry of information and the resulting ad-
verse selection caused by organizations being reluctant to share their actual
levels of cyber-risk may present significant premium pricing obstacles to insur-
ers. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that insurers tend to offer a pricing
structure that charges companies similar rates regardless of the underlying ac-
tual risks [18]. However, if a cyber-insurer cannot differentiate between clients
based on their security level and therefore cannot offer differentiated premiums,
the insurer will not be able to sustain a profitable business [3].
Typically, insurers require organizations to self-report on their security level
in order to determine premiums. Prior to setting the premium, the insurer must
then decide whether the security level reported by the client must be confirmed
by undertaking some audit (e.g., penetration testing). Although it is beneficial
for the insurer to know the exact security level of its potential client so that
it can ask for a fair premium, there is a cost associated with conducting an
audit.4 The insurer has two options: (i) to trust that the security level the client
reported is true and compute the premium based on this level, thereby saving
audit costs; or (ii) not to trust the reported security level and perform an audit
to reveal the real security level despite having to pay for an audit to take place.
After the insurer offers a premium, the client must decide whether it will ac-
cept the offer and be underwritten, or whether it will not use cyber-insurance at
all. This is an important decision to be made, and it has been noticed that many
organizations, especially small-to-medium enterprises, decide not to purchase
cyber-insurance due to the incurred financial costs [11].
Contributions: The aim of this research is to introduce a new model to
study optimal strategies for self-reporting security levels (for organizations) and
undertaking audits (for insurers). The insurers’ strategy aims to ensure that
the actual security levels of their clients have been elicited and therefore “fair”
contracts (coverage, premium) are put in place.
More concretely, we model the interactions between a potential client and an
insurer as a two-player signaling game, where the organization plays the role of
the sender, while the insurer plays the role of the receiver. We assess our game
model using numeric simulations to derive the probability of reporting each type,
4 In fact, the cost of penetration testing, cyber-security risk assessment and related
services is non-trivial and quickly increases with the size of an organization. See, for
example, the pricing examples at: https://www.trustnetinc.com/pricing/.
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Table 1. List of Symbols
Symbol Description
S Set of organization types (i.e., security levels)
Pt Probability of the organization’s type being t
t, T Organization’s real type (realization, random variable)
r,R Organization’s reported type (realization, random variable)
p Cyber-insurance premium
ρt Reporting strategy of organization with real type t
a Insurer’s strategy for auditing the organization
pA Insurer’s strategy for premium selection after auditing
pN Insurer’s strategy for premium selection without auditing
W Organization’s initial wealth
L Organization’s loss in case of a cyber-incident
U Organization’s utility function
C Insurer’s cost for auditing the organization
the audit probabilities, and the insurance premiums for various audit cost values.
The proposed game-theoretic model can form the basis of a framework that can
further accelerate the adoption of cyber-insurance.
2 Model
We model the interactions between an insurer and a potential client, whom we
will call the organization, as a two-player single-shot game. For a list of symbols
that are used in our model, see Table 1. We assume that the organization has a
type t ∈ S, where S is a finite set of types. Type t models the level of security
investments and the combination of security measures that the organization
implements. For simplicity, we let type t be equal to the estimated probability
of the organization not suffering a cyber-incident.
The organization applies for insurance coverage and the insurer determines
the premium as follows:
– First, the organization’s type t is drawn randomly from the set of types S
according to a known distribution5. We let T denote the random variable
taking the value of the organization’s type, and we let Pt denote the proba-
bility that the organization’s type is t (i.e., Pt = Pr[T = t]).
– Second, the organization chooses a type r ∈ S that it reports to the insurer.
The organization’s choice may be randomized based on a mixed strategy.
We let R denote the random variable taking the value of the reported type.
– Based on the reported type r, the insurer decides whether to audit the or-
ganization or not. If the insurer chooses to audit the organization, then the
true type t is revealed, but the insurer incurs a constant auditing cost C.
– Finally, based on the type t or r (depending on whether the organization
has been audited), the insurer chooses a premium p that is asked from the
organization in exchange for insurance coverage. The organization rejects the
5 Randomness models the insurer’s a priori uncertainty regarding what type of orga-
nization it faces.
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coverage if doing so increases its utility; otherwise, it accepts the coverage
and pays the premium.
2.1 Strategies
An organization’s strategic choice is to select what type to report to the insurer.
We let ρt denote the mixed strategy of an organization with real type t, where ρtr
is the probability that the organization reports type r (i.e., ρtr = Pr[R = r |T =
t]). Note that we assume that the organization’s strategic choice does not include
coverage acceptance or rejection (i.e., we assume that coverage is rejected if and
only if it is not worth purchasing). This is similar to assuming that the organi-
zation makes coverage decisions but restricting the solutions to subgame perfect
equilibria (i.e., prohibiting non-credible threats of not purchasing insurance).
Nature
Organization
Insurer
Insurer
Equations (1), (2), (3)
pAt
audit
Insurer
Equations (1), (2), (4)
pNr
not audit
r ∈ S
t ∈ S
Fig. 1. Tree representation of the game. The players’ payoffs are given by Equations (1),
(2), (3), and (4).
The insurer’s first strategic choice is to decide whether to audit the orga-
nization or not. Before auditing, the insurer does not know the organization’s
real type t, but it does know the exogenous parameter values of the model6,
which include the distribution from which the type was drawn (i.e., it knows the
probabilities Pt), as well as the organization’s reporting strategies ρ. We let a
denote the insurer’s strategy, where ar is the probability that the insurer audits
an organization with reported type r. The insurer’s second strategic choice is to
choose a premium p. First, we let pN denote the insurer’s strategy given that
it has not performed an audit, where pNr is the premium asked from an orga-
nization with reported type r. Second, we let pA denote the insurer’s strategy
given that it has performed an audit, where pAt is the premium asked from an
organization with real type t.
2.2 Payoffs
Now, we define the players’ payoffs in the various outcomes of our game. As it is
standard in the cyber-insurance literature, we capture the risk aversion of clients
6 These may be learned from statistics that are available to the insurer.
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using a concave utility function, initial wealth, and potential losses. First, the
organization’s payoff (i.e., utility), if it accepts coverage is
Uorg,acct (p) = U(W − p), (1)
where W is the organization’s initial wealth, and U is its utility function, which
we assume to be continuous, monotonically increasing, and concave.
Second, the organization’s payoff if it rejects coverage is
Uorg,rejt = (1− t) · U(W − L) + t · U(W ), (2)
where L is its loss in case of a cyber-incident. The two terms correspond to the
cases of suffering a cyber-incident and not suffering one, respectively.
If the insurer audits the organization, its payoff (i.e., profit) is
U ins,aud(t, p) = (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{insurance accepted} − C, (3)
where 1{insurance accepted} is equal to 1 if the organization purchases insurance,
and 0 otherwise. If the insurer does not audit, then its payoff is
U ins,noaud(t, p) = (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{insurance accepted}. (4)
Note that the insurer does not learn the true value of t if it does not audit the
organization; however, its payoff still depends on t.
Given mixed-strategy profile (ρ, (a,pN ,pA)), the expected utility of an or-
ganization with type t is
E [Uorgt ]
(
ρ,a,pN ,pA
)
=
∑
r∈S
ρtr
[
ar ·max
{
Uorg,acct (pAt ), Uorg,rejt
}
+ (1− ar) ·max
{
Uorg,acct (pNr ), Uorg,rejt
}]
,
while the insurer’s expected utility is
E
[U ins] (ρ,a,pN ,pA) =∑
t∈S
Pt
∑
r∈S
ρtr
[
ar · U ins,aud(t, pAt ) + (1− ar) · U ins,noaud(t, pNr )
]
.
2.3 Solution Concept
We are interested in finding an equilibrium of our game, which can capture the
long-term insurance market equilibrium. Since our model is essentially a sig-
nalling game, we use perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the solution concept.
After receiving the reported level r, the insurer’s belief regarding the potential
client’s real type can be expressed using Bayes’ rule as
Pr [T = t|R = r] = Pr [T = t, R = r]
Pr [R = r]
=
Pt · ρtr∑
t′∈S Pt′ · ρt′r
.
A mixed-strategy profile (ρ∗, (a∗,pN ∗,pA∗)) is an equilibrium if
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– for each security level t ∈ S, the strategy ρt∗ maximizes the expected utility
of an organization with level t given the insurer’s strategy (a∗,pN ∗,pA∗):
ρt
∗ ∈ argmaxρt E [Uorgt ]
(
ρt,a,pN ,pA
)
;
– for each reported security level r ∈ S, the strategy (a∗,pN ∗,pA∗) maximizes
the expected utility of the insurer given its belief regarding the potential
client’s real type t:
(a∗,pN
∗
,pA
∗
) ∈ argmax(a,pN ,pA)
∑
t∈S
Pr[T = t |R = r]
[
ar · U ins,aud(t, pAt )
+ (1− ar) · U ins,noaud(t, pNr )
]
.
3 Preliminary Analysis
Next, we provide some necessary conditions on the players’ best responses.
Lemma 1. An organization of type t accepts insurance coverage for premium p
if and only if p ≤ pˆt, where
pˆt = W − U−1 ((1− t) · U(W − L) + t · U(W )) . (5)
Proof. By definition, an organization with type t accepts coverage for premium p
if and only if
Uorg,acct (p) ≥ Uorg,rejt
U(W − p) ≥ (1− t) · U(W − L) + t · U(W )
W − p ≥ U−1 ((1− t) · U(W − L) + t · U(W ))
p ≤W − U−1 ((1− t) · U(W − L) + t · U(W )) := pˆt.
uunionsq
Lemma 2. In an equilibrium, the premium pAt
∗
that an insurer requests from an
organization with type t after an audit is pAt
∗
= pˆt if pˆt ≥ (1− t) ·L. Otherwise,
the insurer asks for some premium pAt
∗
> p∗t , which will always be rejected by
the organization.
Proof. If the insurer has audited an organization and found its type to be t, then
its payoff for premium p will be
U ins,aud(t, p) = (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{insurance accepted} − C (6)
= (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{p≤pˆt} − C. (7)
When p ≤ pˆt, the first derivative of the payoff U ins,aud(t, p) is
∂U ins,aud(t, p)
∂p
= 1; (8)
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hence, the maximum on interval (−∞, pˆt] is attained at pˆt, and the maximum
payoff is pˆt − (1 − t) · L − C. When p > pˆt, the payoff is always −C since the
organization rejects coverage. Hence, pˆt is an optimal premium p
A
t
∗
if and only if
pˆt − (1− t) · L− C ≥ −C (9)
pˆt ≥ (1− t) · L; (10)
otherwise, premiums greater than pˆt are optimal, which will be rejected. uunionsq
Lemma 3. In an equilibrium, the premium pNr
∗
that an insurer requests without
an audit from an organization with reported type r is either pNr
∗ ∈ {pˆt | t ∈ S},
which may be accepted by some organizations, or pNr
∗
> max {pˆt | t ∈ S}, which
will be rejected by any organization.
Proof. If the insurer has not audited an organization that reported type r, then
its payoff for premium p will be∑
t∈S
Pr[T = t|R = r]U ins,noaud(t, p) (11)
=
∑
t∈S
Pr[T = t|R = r] (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{insurance accepted} (12)
=
∑
t∈S
Pr[T = t|R = r] (p− (1− t) · L) · 1{p≤pˆt}. (13)
The values {pˆt | t ∈ S} divide the set of possible premium values [0,∞) into
|S|+ 1 contiguous intervals, the last one being (max {pˆt | t ∈ S} ,∞). The payoff
is strictly increasing on each interval, except for the last one. On the last interval,
(max {pˆt | t ∈ S} ,∞), the payoff is always zero. Therefore, the optimal premium
pNr
∗
is either one of the values {pˆt | t ∈ S} or any value pNr ∗ > max {pˆt | t ∈ S},
which will be rejected by any organization. uunionsq
4 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we present numerical illustrations of our model. We let S =
{0.5, 0.65, 0.8, 0.95}, W = 10, L = 5, the utility function U be the natural
logarithm function, and the organization’s type t be drawn according to P0.5 =
0.125, P0.65 = 0.375, P0.8 = 0.375, and P0.95 = 0.125; we used numerical search
to find equilibria for various audit costs C.
Figure 2 shows the organization’s and the insurer’s expected payoffs in equi-
librium as functions of the audit cost C. The organization’s expected payoff
remains steady if it is secure and has little incentive to misreport. But in the
case of an organization with security level 0.5, the payoff increases when the au-
diting cost reaches the value of 0.22. On the other hand, the insurer’s expected
payoff decreases with the auditing cost, but the rate of reduction is fairly small.
Figure 3 shows the probabilities Pr[T = t] of reporting various types as
functions of the audit cost C. We observe rampant misreporting since the or-
ganization’s security level is either t = 0.5 or t = 0.65 with probability 0.5 =
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0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
0
1
2
C
E[U ins]
E[Uorg0.5 ]
E[Uorg0.65]
E[Uorg0.8 ]
E[Uorg0.95]
Fig. 2. Players’ payoffs in equilibrium with various audit cost values.
0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
C
Pr[R = 0.5]
Pr[R = 0.65]
Pr[R = 0.8]
Pr[R = 0.95]
Fig. 3. Probability of reporting each type in equilibrium with various audit cost values.
P0.5 + P0.65, but it never reports these low levels (i.e., Pr[R = 0.5] = 0 and
Pr[R = 0.65] = 0). We also see that the probability Pr[R = 0.95] of misreporting
a higher, “more suspicious” level increases as audits become more expensive.
0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
0
0.5
1
C
a∗0.5
a∗0.65
a∗0.8
a∗0.95
Fig. 4. Audit probabilities in equilibrium with various audit cost values.
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium auditing probabilities a∗ as functions of the
audit cost C. Interestingly, the results show that in an equilibrium, the insurer
does not conduct audits for reported security levels equal to or less than 0.8.
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For reported level 0.95, we observe a sharp threshold: the insurer always audits
if the cost of the audit is less than 0.22, but never audits if it is greater.
0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
2
4
6
8
10
C
pN0.5
∗
pN0.65
∗
pN0.8
∗
pN0.95
∗
Fig. 5. Premiums (without audit) in equilibrium with various audit cost values.
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium premiums without audit pN
∗
as functions
of the audit cost C. We notice that for the lowest security level assessed, 0.5,
the premium is the highest one and remains steady for the entire range of audit
costs. Such a security level means having a 50% chance of getting compromised
and therefore the insurer must ask for a sizable premium. For security levels 0.8
and 0.95, when audit costs are higher than 0.2, the equilibrium premiums are
identical and lower than for the other two security levels, 0.5 and 0.65. In future
work, we will conduct further experiments to understand the behaviour of the
insurer’s strategy in terms of premiums in the equilibrium, considering both the
audited and non-audited cases.
5 Related Work
We discuss two classes of related work: literature on cyber-insurance—more
specifically on adverse selection, moral hazard, and information asymmetries—
and literature on security audits.
Cyber-insurance and Information Asymmetry: Some of the main fac-
tors that hinder cyber-risk management via cyber-insurance are risk correlations,
interdependence, and information asymmetries [8]. Among these, we focus on in-
formation asymmetries, which are taken into account by many articles in the field
of security economics and cyber-insurance [4,12,17,20].
Shetty et al. [21,22] prove a proposition providing a condition, which when
satisfied, states that any insurance contract with security levels unobservable
by the insurers strictly decreases the utility of the users, leading to a missing
insurance market. Yet, with insurers present, and security levels contractible, in
any equilibrium, full client coverage is offered.
Schwartz et al. [19] investigate the occurrence of a “lemon market” [2] when
insurers cannot differentiate between different risk behaviors of clients. Lack of
rich information about user choices and activities, leads to information asym-
metry, which worsens the usual insurers’ problems of moral hazard and adverse
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selection. They prove that no matter how small the fraction of malicious users
is, an equilibrium does not exist, and therefore the cyber-insurance market is
missing. In addition, they claim that due to adverse selection, cyber-insurers
would not underwrite contracts conditioning user premiums on their security.
Bandyopadhyay et al. [5] build an economic model describing an optimal
cyber-insurance contract and the optimal claim strategy for the insured firm.
They show that insured firms optimally transfer more risk through insurance
contracts under information symmetry than otherwise. They also present a circle
of steps going from information symmetry for the cyber-insurance market to
information asymmetry when the client first realizes the effect of IT risks, to
end up back in information symmetry when the insurer finds out about the
altered claiming and buying behavior as well as the underlying reasons.
Security Audits for Cyber-insurance Underwriting: In [3], Baer and
Parkinson suggest that both insurers and clients are sophisticated in dealing
with security assessments regarding cyber-insurance coverage decisions. Cyber-
insurers demand audits by independent consultants on a case-by-case basis, de-
pending on the risks to be insured and the client requirements with regards to
policy limits [10]. For example, the largest cyber-insurance underwriter, called
AIG, asks prospective clients to complete an “Information Security Self Assess-
ment” online. The results of such self-assessments determine whether the insurer
will undertake a security audit on client’s premises to bind coverage.
Bo¨hme [7] argues that security audits can generate positive utility overcoming
information asymmetries in a scenario focused on “solving coordination prob-
lems.” According to this, the players themselves decide about their own security
investment and whether or not to give away information about the resulting
security level. Security audits are a tangible way to derive such security levels.
The author states that it is difficult to measure the security level of products
due to: (i) the difficulty of specifying all security requirements; and (ii) attacks
neither occur deterministically nor is their occurrence observable in real time.
The hardness of measurement implies significant effort to undertake a meaning-
ful audit and requires special knowledge and experience. The difficulty of the
audit increases disproportionately to the complexity of the system due to the
non-linear growth of interdependencies among different assets.
Khalili et al. [13] suggest that recent advances in Internet measurement com-
bined with machine learning techniques enable accurate quantitative assessments
of security posture at a firm level. They claim that this can be used as a tool
to perform an initial security audit, or pre-screening, of a prospective client to
better enable premium discrimination and the design of customized policies.
6 Conclusions
Cyber-insurers face the challenge of devising a policy that is “reasonable” for
the client to purchase but profitable for the insurer as well. To elicit risk levels
for premium calculations, the insurer either asks the organization to conduct
some self-assessment and report it, or it undertakes an audit to identify the real
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security level with certainty. Further, the possibility of being audited by the
insurer may incentivize the organization to report truthfully. However, such an
audit introduces costs for the insurer, which may be relatively high.
We introduced a new model to study optimal strategies for self-reporting
security levels (for organizations) and undertaking expensive audits (for insur-
ers). The insurers’ strategy aims to ensure that the actual security levels of their
clients have been elicited and therefore “fair” contracts (coverage, premium) are
put in place. More concretely, we modeled the interactions between a potential
client and an insurer as a two-player signaling game, where the organization
plays the role of the sender, while the insurer plays the role of the receiver. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to attempt studying incentives
for auditing potential clients before cyber-insurance premium calculations. The
proposed model may form the basis of a framework that can further accelerate
the adoption of cyber-insurance.
Our model and analyses do have certain limitations, which we intend to
improve upon in future work. First, future work may allow the insurer to offer
multiple levels of coverage (for different premiums) to an organization; i.e., when
the insurer computes premiums, it also associates these premiums with certain
degrees of loss recovery. Secondly, future work may allow the insurer to perform
cyber-forensics when a claim is filed in order to reveal whether the organization
was honest when reporting its security level. In this case, the insurer avoids au-
diting costs, but may still be able to deter clients from misreporting. We shall
investigate the trade-offs between forensics and auditing costs. Furthermore, we
will consider penalties for untruthful organizations. Punishment of such behavior
may be realized in the form of increased premiums or reduction of some reputa-
tion metric that affects any future cyber-insurance contract of the organization.
More ambitiously, our plan is to work with cyber-insurers to acquire realistic
data as part of a recently funded research project.
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